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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to compare the antecedents of opportunism and its effect on
unethical negotiation tactics among US and Belgian managers.
Design/methodology/approach – Samples of managers in both countries are surveyed and
cross-country analysis using multi-group structural equation modeling is conducted.
Findings – Across both countries, deceitful tendencies and relativism are found to be significant
predictors of opportunism, which in turn predicts receptiveness to unethical negotiating tactics;
however, Belgian managers were found to have higher levels of these constructs, possibly indicating a
greater propensity to engage in unethical behaviors than US managers.
Research limitations/implications – The current research is limited by the relatively small size of
the Belgian sample, differences in data collection method, and the lack of additional contextual
measures, which may influence the managers’ responses.
Practical implications – The finding that the same structural relationships hold across the US and
Belgium samples provides insights for both groups of managers engaged in negotiations.
Originality/value – The paper offers a comparative perspective on US and Belgian managers and
establishes the validity and applicability of frequently used ethics scales in Belgium, a country
infrequently studied in this context.
Keywords United States of America, Belgium, Managers, Negotiating, Ethics
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
Negotiation has been defined as “a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by
which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through
jointly-decided action than they could otherwise” (Lax and Sebenious, 1986, p. 11). It is
a tactical process, potentially littered with ethical dilemmas as each party seeks to
maximize their own outcomes.
Instances of unethical behaviors have muddied the negotiation process across the
globe (“Global anti-corruption drive”, International Construction, 2004; African
Business, 2004, “Lesotho corruption appeal backfires”). It thus becomes imperative for
business managers to understand the ethical mindsets of their global negotiation
partners (Bagozzi, 1995). In the negotiation ethics literature, barring a few exceptions
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(e.g. Malshe et al., n.d.), little explicit attention has been devoted to opportunism in
negotiation (Robinson et al., 2000) and scarce guidance exists for US managers on how
to deal with the ethical components of global negotiations.
A case in point is the heightened need for American negotiators to understand the
ethical perspectives of Belgian managers; given Belgium’s rank as the 11th-largest
market for the export of US goods and services (CIA World Factbook, 2007), the
possibility of expansion in this trade partnership, and the lack of extant knowledge
about Belgian negotiation ethics. Further, Belgian managers’ poor reputation may
inhibit US managers’ willingness to seek closer relationships with them (Helper and
Levine, 1992) and absent any comparative assessment, Belgians may project their
self-perceptions to their US counterparts and suspect US managers as also being
untrustworthy partners (Sakalaki et al., 2007).
Since little prior empirical research has focused on the negotiation ethics of Belgian
managers, this paper draws on the findings from extant empirical studies and models
opportunism as arising from intrinsically ethical orientations. Specifically, this paper
aims to compare and contrast:
.
the role of relativism and deceitful tendencies as antecedents of opportunism; and
.
how opportunism impacts managers’ perception of unethical negotiation tactics
in the US and Belgian contexts.
This paper’s contribution lies in:
.
positioning opportunism as an unrestrained self-interest maximization (with
guile) that may emerge to the fullest extent feasible and profitable in the
competitive negotiation process (Bonoma, 1976);
.
highlighting how relativism and deceitful tendencies may serve as antecedents
of opportunism both in the US and Belgian contexts;
.
comparing the relationships between deceitful tendencies, relativism,
opportunism and unethical negotiation tactics that Malshe et al. (forthcoming)
showed in the US context with that in the Belgian context;
.
validating the various business ethics scales in the Belgian context; and
.
contributing to the divergence/convergence debate in a global context.
Constructs and conceptual domains
We treat opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). Our
definition is consistent with John’s (1984) explication of this concept as shirking, or
failing to fulfill promises and obligations. Relativism (Forsyth, 1980) reflects the
individual’s rejection of universal moral principles. Deceitful tendencies are defined as
“the intention of creating or adding support to a false belief in another party” (Cramton
and Dees, 1993), and is operationalized as the propensity to lie since it “benefits the
communicator” (Triandis, 2001). While opportunism represents failing to fulfill
promise, deceitful tendencies represent a propensity to lie and create a false belief in
other party. The five unethical negotiation tactics are:
(1) Inappropriate information gathering.
(2) Misrepresentation of information.
(3) Traditional competitive bargaining.

(4) Attacking negotiating opponent’s network.
(5) Making false promises (Lewicki and Robinson, 1998).

Deceitful
tendencies

In this paper, we treat the executives’ perceptions regarding the appropriateness of
using the previous five unethical negotiation tactics as outcome variables.
Literature review and hypotheses
Opportunism
Opportunism (Williamson, 1975) has been one of the more provocative concepts in the
management literature. While self-interest seeking has long been a cornerstone of
economics and management, Williamson notes that it need not be pursued honestly;
rather, people may look after their interests while trying to skirt or break the rules or
norms of behavior. Specifically, Williamson (1975) defines opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile”.
Research shows that opportunistic behavior can have a crippling effect on exchange
in the form of decreased efficiency and inequitable distribution. Thus, managing
opportunism so that exchange partners deliver on agreed-on obligations is a major
challenge in conducting global business (Aulakh et al., 1996), and investigating its
impact on exchange partners’ perceptions of unethical negotiation practices should be
beneficial, both domestically and internationally.
While scholars (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Stump and Heide, 1996) exhort that
opportunism must be minimized during transactions, they have not extensively
studied the impact of opportunism in the negotiation ethics context. Hunt and Morgan
(1995) suggest that people’s tendency to act opportunistically should be explored and
not assumed while Williamson himself notes that not all agents should be regarded as
opportunistic in identical degree. Implicit in Williamson’s treatment of the construct’s
variability is the suggestion that it has antecedents, that it is, in fact,
an endogenous variable. Prior research has not typically treated opportunism as an
endogenous variable; some exceptions involve understanding the organizational and
environmental factors that may impact it (e.g. John, 1984; Joshi and Arnold, 1997). We
hypothesize and test the role of other factors intrinsic to the individual.
Ethical orientation (relativism) and opportunism
Individuals use ethical guidelines based on one of two moral philosophies:
deontological and teleological (Hunt and Vitell, 1986). Deontological philosophy
focuses on the specific actions or behaviors of an individual, whereas teleological
philosophy focuses on the consequences of the actions. This paradigm is parallel to
Forsyth’s (1980) two-dimensional personal moral philosophies concept –
idealism/relativism. Specifically, idealism, which parallels the deontological
perspective, describes the degree to which individuals understand actions as right
or wrong and believe that a “right” decision can be made in an ethically tenuous
situation, keeping in mind others’ welfare when evaluating alternatives. Less idealistic
individuals may make decisions irrespective of its impact on others. Relativism, not an
opposite, but a separate dimension, is the degree to which an individual rejects
universal moral norms in making ethical judgments. High relativists make decisions
on a situation-specific basis while low relativists believe that standard rules can be
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applied across situations. Forsyth (1992) suggested that individuals’ ethical ideologies
should have an impact on how he/she would handle ethically challenging situations.
We argue that when people will face situations where their perceived self-interests
run contrary to operational norms, individuals low on relativism will most likely
sacrifice self-interest for the sake of said norms. A relativist, in contrast, will not be as
willing to forgo their narrow interests. First, relativists do not believe in absolute moral
values and apply different sets of rules while interpreting and responding to different
situations. This may provide relativists with greater flexibility in interpreting
situations and allow them to respond in a manner that best suits their needs. Second, a
relativistic orientation affords individuals the freedom to justify their moral judgments
and responses and not be “constrained” by the need to maintain consistency in varying
circumstances. Self-interest seeking relativists may not be able to truly maximize
self-interest without being willing rejecting external norms (Bonoma, 1976).
That relativistic tendencies are strongly related to opportunism has found empirical
support. Malshe et al. (n.d.) show how opportunism acts as an explicit mediator within
the relationship between relativism and perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.
Rawwas et al. (2004), found that, among the US, and, Chinese marketing students, those
who were least critical of academic dishonesty tended to score highly on both
relativism, and opportunism. Similarly, Rawwas et al. (2006) found that students at a
Japanese religious university were most likely to attribute unethical behavior to people
perceived to score highly on relativism and opportunism.
Based on the previous discussion, we hypothesize:
H1. Relativism is positively related to opportunism.
Deceitful tendencies and opportunism
Deception in negotiation has long been a topic of concern in business ethics (Christie
and Geis, 1970). Deception involves “the intention of creating or adding support to a
false belief in another party” (Cramton and Dees, 1993). Mitchell (1986) defines
deception as “a false communication that tends to benefit the communicator”. Deceit
has been viewed as a component of the larger, multidimensional construct of
Machiavellianism (Hunter et al., 1982), which examines the individual’s opinions
regarding lying and honesty; and as a component of manipulativeness that amounts to
lying and cheating to get what one wants. People who tend to score highly on
Machiavellianism practice manipulative acts with detachment and perceive little guilt
when lying. Withholding or distorting information, shirking and failing to fulfill
promises or obligations are also examples of deceitful behavior.
The objective behind deceitful behavior by a partner firm during negotiation is to
seek gain at the expense of its negotiation opponent. Negotiators face uncertainty
about the other party’s goals and intentions, which, combined with the competitive
nature of negotiation, produces a ripe environment for protecting one’s personal
interest (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hagarty and Sims, 1978). This may be achieved by
controlling the amount and accuracy of information revealed to the other party- a
manifestation of deceit.
Scholars have largely focused on understanding either the reasons for deception or
its frequency. While previous research (Scott and Jehn, 1991) focused on the situational
and the target factors that lead to lying, it also acknowledges that people differ in their
deceitful tendencies. For example, the business ethics literature suggests that the

characteristics of the individual and the situation both affect the likelihood to engage in
deceit (Hagarty and Sims, 1978).
We continue in this direction and conceptualize deceitful tendencies as a personality
characteristic that varies across individuals. We draw on our discussion of the previous
literature as well as on Malshe et al. (n.d.) to argue that deceitful tendencies impact the
perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics via giving rise to opportunism. Based on the
extant theoretical rationale and empirical evidence, we hypothesize that a negotiator’s
deceitful tendencies are positively related to his/her opportunistic behavior.
H2. Deceitful tendencies are positively related to opportunism.
Opportunism and unethical negotiation tactics
The context of negotiations provides a fertile ground in which to explore the concept of
opportunism. As Lewicki and Stark (1996) have noted, effective negotiators arguably
cannot be fully candid about their preferences and positions. While widely studied in
marketing and management, opportunism has not received wide attention in the ethics
literature.
Lewicki and Stark (1996) and Lewicki and Robinson (1998) have identified five
types of unethical negotiating tactics as highlighted earlier- inappropriate information
gathering, information misrepresentation, competitive bargaining, attacking the
opponent’s network, and making false promises. While there is substantial theoretical
and empirical evidence suggesting that opportunism and unethical negotiation tactics
are independent constructs other research suggests a positive relationship between
opportunism and the perception of unethical issues. Specifically, individuals scoring
high on the opportunism scale are likely to behave unethically (Al-Khatib et al., 2007;
Hunt and Chonko, 1984). Further, Al-Khatib et al. (2008), compared US and Arab
executives’ negotiation ethics finding that opportunism showed a significant positive
effect on the perceptions of all of the unethical negotiation tactics in the US sample
whereas in the Arab sample, it had a significant relationship with inappropriate
information gathering, information misrepresentation, and making false promise and a
marginally significant relationship with the remaining two outcomes. Malshe et al.
(n.d.) have also shown a positive relationship between opportunism and the five
unethical negotiation tactics.
Opportunists perceive unethical negotiation tactics as acceptable because they may
believe it is appropriate to use any means to accomplish personal and organizational
goals, including manipulation, and persuasion (Hunt and Chonko, 1984). Newstead et al.
(1996) find that cheaters rationalize their behavior by blaming it on the situation rather
than themselves, and, as noted earlier, negotiations provide an ideal situation to which
to attribute blame.
Based on the previous, we hypothesize the following:
H3. Higher levels of opportunism will result in greater propensity to engage in
each type of unethical negotiation tactic.
Figure 1 presents the hypothesized relationships among our constructs.
Comparison between the US and Belgian contexts
In this section, we argue that the relationships we hypothesized previously will hold
true both in the US and Belgian contexts. In both collectivist and individualist societies,
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Figure 1.
Conceptual model

deception, opportunism and unethical behaviors have the potential to damage one’s
relation with a negotiation partner. In collectivist cultures, like Belgium (Hofstede,
1980), the parameters for opportunistic behavior, deception, rejection of absolute moral
rules and unethical behaviors are based on group membership of the negotiating
partners and norms present within a specific social/cultural context. In individualistic
cultures, like the US, personal relationships and the interest in these relationships
dominate.
Therefore both collectivistic (Belgium) and individualistic (US) cultures have
appropriate mechanisms to guard against the display of unethical behavior. It is
therefore that we hypothesize that the magnitudes of the heretofore hypothesized
relationships do not differ across the US and Belgian cultural contexts:
H4. The magnitude of the relationships of relativism and deceitful tendencies to
opportunism, and of opportunism to the negotiation tactics will not differ
between US, and Belgian managers.
How cultural differences impact ethical ideology and behavior
While we have argued that the strength of relationships between relativism, deceitful
tendencies and opportunism and opportunism and perceptions of unethical negotiation
tactics will not differ across the two cultures, we argue that the US and Belgian
managers will differ from one another on the extent to which they exhibit relativism,
deceitful tendencies, opportunism, and their perceptions of each of the unethical
negotiation tactics. First, scholars (Al-Khatib et al., 2005a, b; Vitell et al., 1993) suggest
that cultural variations may manifest in differences in individuals’ ethical orientations.
Further, Hunt and Vitell (1986, 1992) propose that “cultural norms affect perceived
ethical situations, perceived alternatives, perceived consequences, deontological
norms, probabilities of consequences, desirability of consequences and importance of
stakeholders” (p. 10). This indicates that when it comes to ethical orientations,
managers from different cultures will exhibit differences.
Second, Hofstede (1980) places the USA and Belgium differently along the four
cultural dimensions. The USA is low on power distance, low on uncertainty avoidance,
moderate on masculinity/femininity, and high on individualism. In contrast, Belgium
scores moderately on power distance, is high on uncertainty avoidance, low on
masculinity, and moderately high on individualism dimension. It is plausible that
opportunism may be less likely in low power distance cultures such as the USA owing
to natural power sharing and more participative and consultative decision-making. On

the contrary, the uses of power and coercion may be frequent occurrences in the
relatively higher power-distance Belgian culture (Kale and McIntyre, 1991). Previous
studies have reported a positive relationship between power distance and unethical
behavior such as taking advantage of the underclass (Husted, 1999; Volkema, 2004). In
summary, high power distance represents unequal power distribution and limited
interaction between social classes (Volkema and Fluery, 2002), providing an
atmosphere conducive for individuals to lie and serve their own means, be
opportunistic, and exhibit greater acceptance of such tactics.
Third, previous studies have found that the perceptions among other Europeans
of the ethics of Belgian managers are often poor (Jeurissen and van Luijk, 1998; Van
Kenhove et al., 2001). Aaccording to Transparency International, Belgium fairs
poorly on the scale of corruption (Van Kenhove et al., 2001). Jeurissen and van Luijk
(1998) found Belgian managers to rank in the lower tier of European countries on
ethical business conduct and on the quality of business relations while the ethical
conduct and the quality of business relations with US managers was rated quite
positively.
In summary, higher power distance within the Belgian context may allow Belgian
managers greater flexibility to engage in opportunistic behavior, lie, and act
unethically in an attempt to look out for their self-interest. Further, collectivism may
motivate them to be suspicious and distrustful of their negotiating counterparts, who
may be treated as outsiders, thereby engaging in greater opportunism, lying, and
unethical practices; something that individualist US manager may not be prone to. In
addition, evidence from extant research has shown that perceptions regarding ethics of
Belgian managers are poor. We hypothesize:
H5. US managers will have lower relativism scores than their Belgian
counterparts.
H6. US managers will exhibit lower deceitful tendencies than their Belgian
counterparts.
H7. US managers will be less opportunistic than their Belgian counterparts
H8. Belgian mangers will have higher levels of endorsement than their US
counterparts for each type of questionable negotiation tactic.
Methodology
Sampling and data collection
We collected data in the USA and Belgium. While data collection methods differed
between countries, our sample shared common characteristics in terms of industries
represented (banking, advertising, health care, manufacturing, and trading), positions
held (marketing managers or senior marketing executives), and job function
(negotiating and contracting with external entities). We asked all responders to
reflect on a major contract they negotiated within the past one-year, while answering
our survey.
In the USA, data were collected as described in Malshe et al. (n.d.). Specifically
e-mails with a survey link embedded within were sent to the Institute for Supply
Management’s (ISM) 3,200 US-based members, with a reminder after one week. We
guaranteed respondent anonymity. A total of 466 ISM members clicked on the
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active survey link and 259 individuals completed the questionnaire, resulting in an
overall response rate of 12.1 percent, which compares favorably to some other
published studies (e.g. Ranchhod and Zhou, 2001). We compared early (response
within a week) and late responders (response after reminder) to test for
non-response bias and did not find significant difference (Armstrong and
Overton, 1977).
Owing to the lack of mailing lists in Belgium, we used General Business
Directory in Antwerp for identifying 200 potential respondents. On their consent to
participate, we gave them basic procedural instructions; the English language
survey was hand-delivered in the morning, and picked-up at the end of the same
workday. This resulted in an operational data set of 153 respondents, for a response
rate of 76 percent. The data collection in Belgium occurred immediately after the
data collection in the USA. A comparison between respondents and non-respondents
in Belgium did not reveal any significant differences; hence, non-response bias was
not an issue in Belgium. Table I summarizes the demographic characteristics of the
two samples.
Survey instrument
Our measure of relativism was taken from the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ)
(Forsyth, 1980) and was purified, leaving seven of the original ten items. Opportunism
was measured using a five item five-point Likert scale (Dwyer and Oh, 1988). Deceitful
tendencies were measured using a portion of the MACH IV scale (Christie and Geis,
1970) that comprises three reverse-coded items. Last, we measured perceptions of
unethical negotiation tactics using the Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation
Strategies Scale (SINS scale) (Robinson et al., 2000). Tables II and III show the scale
items.
Data analysis
We assessed the internal consistency of our measures using Cronbach’s alpha. While
most composite reliabilities were above 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), an exception was the
Relativism and Deceitful Tendencies scales. As mentioned earlier, we purified the
Relativism scale, and yet, it had a marginal reliability. The reliability for the Deceit
scale is marginal as well. Scholars have noted the difficulty in finding scales that work
well cross-culturally; hence, scale reliability of less than 0.70 in some countries should
not be considered unusual (Nunnally, 1978). Table IV presents pertinent scale
statistics.

Table I.
Demographic
characteristic of the
samples

Gender
Male (%)
Female (%)
Education
Company size
, 250 employees (%)
. 250 employees (%)
Years in current position

The USA

Belgium

80
20
Over 90 percent with college degree

61
39
79 percent with college degree

42
58
Nine years

35
65
5.8 years

3.56/1.53
4.88/1.31
2.89/0.72

0.82

0.79

0.69

2.14/0.79

0.64

2.66/1.0
2.70/1.13

4.67/1.6

0.81

0.77
0.72

1.62/1.0

0.73

3.07/0.65
3.29/0.64
3.43/1.0

1.64/0.99
1.60/0.95

0.82
0.72

0.80
0.73
0.72

2.55/0.7
2.38/0.79
2.32/1.2

0.80
0.70
0.76

0.56

0.31

0.34

0.39
0.35

0.38
0.41

0.31

0.19

0.15

0.29
0.13

0.36
0.32

0.56

0.50

0.54

0.53
0.29

0.57

0.36

0.41

0.45

0.60
0.45

0.62

0.55

0.56

0.56

0.68
0.67

0.39

0.56

0.56

0.61
0.52

0.47

0.52

0.47

0.59

Belgium sample

0.31

0.30

0.69

0.61

0.47

0.42

0.49

0.23

0.31

0.53

Information
False Attacking
Relativism Opportunism misrepresentation promise opponent

Note: All correlations significant at p , 0.05 across both samples

Relativism
Opportunism
Info
misrepresentation
False promise
Attacking
opponent
Inappropriate
info gathering
Competitive
bargaining
Deceitful
tendencies

Relativism
Opportunism
Info
misrepresentation
False promise
Attacking
opponent
Inappropriate
info gathering
Competitive
bargaining
Deceitful
tendencies

Alpha

Mean/
SD

US sample

0.43

0.47

0.26

0.28

Inappropriate
information
gathering

0.45

0.19

Competitive Deceitful
bargaining.
tend

Deceitful
tendencies
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Configural and measurement invariance
Since our scales had not been tested in Belgian context before, we wanted to establish
their configural and measurement invariance across the two country samples first
(Horn and McArdle, 1992). Accordingly, we used EQS (Bentler, 1992) to conduct a
multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for each country with no cross-country
constraints imposed (Byrne, 2003). The results of these models and the fit statistics are
also shown in Tables II and III. All factor loadings were significant. Further, fit indices
such as CFI of 0.989 and the Bentler non-Normed Fit Index (BNNFI) of 0.988 indicate
that the model had an acceptable fit across both countries. This provides evidence that
our constructs can be conceptualized in the same way across the two countries
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998).
To test for measurement invariance, we assessed whether:
.
the items comprising the measuring instruments operate equivalently;
.
factorial structure of each construct is equivalent; and
.
paths in the specified causal structure are invariant across two countries (Byrne,
2003; p. 159).
Specifically, we constrained parameters in a logically ordered and increasingly
restrictive fashion. We first constrained factor loadings paths. Next, we added
constraints on factor variances followed by finally adding constraints on factor
covariances. All the previous tests resulted in acceptable model fits indicating
cross-country invariance on our measures (see Table V). Thus, we can be confident that
scores on items, can be meaningfully compared across countries and that observed
item differences are indicative of similar cross-national differences in the underlying
construct.
Next, we evaluated convergent and discriminant validity. Specifically, we tested
whether the correlations among constructs significantly departed from 1.0. This was
the first criterion for establishing discriminant validity. Further, with the exception of
one item in our revised Relativism scale (“there are no ethical principles that are so
important that they should be a part of any code of ethics”), no other items were found
to cross-load on other constructs thus satisfying the second criteria used by Calantone
et al. (2006). We decided to retain this problematic item owing to its conceptual
importance as well as its inter-item and item-to-total correlation with the relativism
scale. We also conducted paired tests of all the constructs in order to ascertain that they

The USA

Table III.
Construct Reliability (CR)
and Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)

Relativism
Deceit
Opportunism
Inappropriate information gathering
Information misrepresentation
Competitive bargaining
Attacking opponent network
Making false promises

Belgium

CR

AVE

CR

AVE

0.73
0.62
0.65
0.73
0.76
0.81
0.67
0.82

0.29
0.37
0.39
0.48
0.44
0.58
0.51
0.61

0.77
0.59
0.69
0.80
0.71
0.80
0.76
0.77

0.34
0.34
0.42
0.59
0.39
0.57
0.62
0.55

Construct
Items
Relativism
There are no ethical principles that are so important
that they should be a part of any code of ethics
What is ethical varies from one situation and
society to another
Different types of moralities can not be compared
as to “rightness”
What is ethical for everyone can never be resolved
since what is moral or immoral is up to the
individual
Moral standards are simply personal rules which
indicate how a person should behave, and are not to
be applied in making judgments of others
Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are
so complex that individuals should be allowed to
formulate their own individual codes
Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents
certain types of actions stands in the way of better
human relations and adjustments
Deceitful tendencies
Honesty is the best policy in all cases (reverse
coded)
There is no excuse for lying to someone else
(reverse coded)
When you ask someone to do something for you it
is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather
than giving reasons which carry more weight
(reverse coded)
Opportunism
You may promise your negotiation counterpart to
do something without actually doing it later
Sometimes you may have to alter the facts slightly
in order to get what you need from your negotiation
counterpart
Occasionally you will shirk certain negotiated
agreements/obligations when you see profitable
opportunities from doing so
Inappropriate information gathering
Gain information about an opponent’s negotiating
position by paying your friends, associates, and
contacts to get this information for you
Gain information about an opponent’s negotiating
position by cultivating his/her friendship through
expensive gifts, entertaining or “personal favors”
Gain information about an opponent’s negotiating
position by trying to recruit or hire one of your
opponent’s teammates (on the condition that the
teammate bring confidential information with him/
her)

The USA
Std.
loading
(t-value) *

Belgium
Std.
loading
(t-value) *

0.36

4.75)

0.28

3.30)

0.60

8.50

0.47

5.71

0.41

5.46

0.58

7.29

0.64

9.18)

0.81

11.21

0.51

6.95

0.76

10.29

0.62

8.79

0.58

7.32

0.54

7.50

0.43

5.25

0.67

8.74

0.66

8.28

0.69

8.99

0.39

4.69

0.43

5.50

0.65

8.17

0.77

12.09

0.55

6.51

0.44

6.19

0.71

8.76

0.62

9.22

0.69

8.56

0.61

9.32

0.77

10.59

0.74

12.00

0.67

8.80

0.73

11.77

0.85

12.11

(continued)
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Table IV.

Construct
Items
Information misrepresentation
Intentionally misrepresent information to your
opponent in order to strengthen your negotiating
arguments or position
Intentionally misrepresent the nature of
negotiations to your constituency in order to
protect delicate discussions that have occurred
Deny the validity of information, which your
opponent has, that weakens your negotiating
position, even though that information is true and
valid.
Intentionally misrepresent the progress of
negotiations to your constituency in order to make
your own position appear stronger
Traditional competitive bargaining
Make an opening demand that is far greater than
what you really hope to settle for
Convey a false impression that you are in
absolutely no hurry to come to a negotiated
agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on
your opponent to concede quickly
Make an opening demand so high/low that it
seriously undermines your opponent’s confidence in
his/her ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement
Attacking opponent
Attempt to get your opponent fired from his/her
position so that a new person will take his/her place
Threaten to make your opponent look weak or
foolish in front of a boss or others to who he/she is
accountable, even if you know that you will not
actually carry out the threat
Making false promises
Promise that good things will happen to your
opponent if he/she gives you what you want, even if
you know that you cannot (or will not) deliver these
things when the other’s cooperation is obtained
In return for concessions from your opponent now,
offer to make future concessions which you know
you will not follow through on
Guarantee that your constituency will uphold the
settlement reached, although you know that they
will likely violate the agreement later
x 2 (df)
Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (BNFI)
Bentler-Bonnet Non-normed Fit Index (BNNFI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square error of Approximation
(RMSEA)
Note: *All t-values significant at the p , 0.05 level

The USA
Std.
loading
(t-value) *

Belgium
Std.
loading
(t-value) *

0.63

9.83

0.74

10.52

0.63

9.66

0.57

7.74

0.70

11.28

0.61

8.34

0.70

11.27

0.55

7.44

0.78

12.81

0.81

11.02

0.81

13.50

0.75

9.94

0.71

11.20

0.70

9.04

0.56

7.58

0.60

7.97

0.85

10.85

0.94

16.50

0.83

15.04

0.92

13.59

0.82

14.77

0.68

9.06

0.70

11.61

0.57

7.35

1891.54
0.984
0.988
0.989
0.09

645

discriminate well from one another. Our results indicated good discriminant validity
for the constructs we used.
Structural model and hypotheses testing
With the acceptable measurement models across two countries, we estimated a two
group structural model, allowing the structural paths to vary across countries. While
multiple-group models are inherently difficult (Calantone et al. 2006), our results
indicate a good fit. We present the results in Table VI. The chi-square for the model
was significant (x2ðdfÞ ¼ 2190:23ð688Þ) but the other fit statistics, such as CFI (0.987)
and BNNFI (0.986), indicate that model fits the data well. The structural paths from
Relativism to Opportunism, Deceitful Tendencies to Opportunism and Opportunism to
each of the five negotiation tactics are significant. This model thus provides support
for H1, H2 and H3.

Fit statistics

x 2 (df)
BNFI
BNNFI
CFI
RMSEA

Factor
loadings
1937.347 (665)
0.984
0.988
0.989
0.098

H3
H3
H3
H3
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Constrained in each model
Factor loadings þ
Factor loadings þ factor
factor variances
variances þ factor covariances
1956.616 (672)
0.984
0.988
0.989
0.098

Hypothesis Structural paths
H1
H2
H3

Deceitful
tendencies

Relativism (F1) ! Opportunism (F3)
Deceit (F2) ! Opportunism (F3)
Opportunism (F3) ! Inappropriate
information gathering (F4)
Opportunism (F3) ! Information
misrepresentation (F5)
Opportunism (F3) ! Competitive
bargaining (F6)
Opportunism (F3) ! Attacking
opponents (F7)
Opportunism (F3) ! False promise (F8)
x 2 (df)
Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (BNFI)
Bentler-Bonnet Non-normed Fit Index
(BNNFI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

Note: *All t-values significant at the p , 0.05 level

2041.660 (700)
0.983
0.987
0.988
0.098

The USA
Std.
loading
t-value

Table V.
Test of measurement
invariance

Belgium
Std.
loading
t-value

0.25
0.43
0.88

2.65
4.13
7.20

0.37
0.74
0.72

2.74
3.87
(4.69

0.84

7.22

0.98

5.17

0.44

5.07

0.65

4.47

0.70

5.32

0.34

3.15

9.64
688

0.84

5.14

0.96
2190.23
0.982
0.986
0.987
0.095

Table VI.
Structural model: US and
Belgian samples
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To examine H4, we constrained the structural paths in the two country structural
model to be equal across groups. Table VII presents the fit indices and the constrained
cross-country structural paths for this model. The fit indices indicate (CFI ¼ 0.987;
BNNFI ¼ 0.986) that the model fits the data well. Further, all the hypothesized paths
are significant (p , 0:05). Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Tests in EQS (Bentler, 1992) did
not suggest any significant cross-country differences in the structural model. Hence,
H4 is supported.
H5, H6, H7 and H8 suggested that US managers are less relativist, less deceitful,
less opportunistic, and more critical of the questionable negotiation tactics than their
Belgian counterparts. We tested these hypotheses using the latent means comparison
test (Byrne, 2006, p. 261). Specifically, we designated the USA as a reference group and
compared the Belgian sample to it. The key parameters in testing the hypotheses are
the factor intercepts as they represent the latent mean values for the factors tested. Our
analysis suggests that there was a significant difference between the US and Belgian
managers on all the constructs. Table VIII contains the relevant statistics.
Discussion
In both countries, executives with higher relativistic tendencies are likely to be more
opportunistic. Likewise, executives in both countries with deceitful tendencies are
Structural paths (standardized)

Table VII.
Constrained structural
model

Relativism ! Opportunism
Deceitful Tendencies ! Opportunism
Opportunism ! Inappropriate information gathering
Opportunism ! Information misrepresentation
Opportunism ! Competitive bargaining
Opportunism ! Attacking opponents
Opportunism ! False promise
x 2 (df)
Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index (BNFI)
Bentler-Bonnet Non-normed Fit Index (BNNFI)
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)

t-value *

0.61
0.41
1.72
1.83
1.38
0.63
1.84
2210.618
0.981
0.986
0.987
0.099

4.03
6.17
8.72
9.56
7.29
6.00
10.56
695

Note: *All t-values significant at the p , 0.05 level

Construct

Table VIII.
Latent mean comparison

Constrained path coefficient

Relativism
Deceitful Tendencies
Opportunism
Inappropriate information gathering
Information misrepresentation
Competitive bargaining
Attacking opponent network
Making false promises
Note: *All values significant at the p , 0.05

z-statistic *
85.20
34.24
41.86
12.25
17.68
86.93
13.63
12.38

likely to be more opportunistic. Opportunism is likely to give rise to each of the
unethical negotiation tactics for both samples. While the theoretical relationships
among constructs were not found to differ across countries, there were differences in
the levels of the constructs. Specifically managers in the USA scored in a more ethical
direction for all measures.
To explore the possibility that differing methods between the countries produced
some of our results, we followed the recommendations of Podsakoff et al. (2003) and
used Harman’s single-factor test as well as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test
for method factor. Additionally, we tested a multifactor measurement model and a
measurement model with an additional method factor added for each of the countries;
inclusion of these method factors did not significantly improve the model fit (Carlson
and Kacmar, 2000).
Theoretical and managerial implications
Drawing on the empirical findings within the USA, we show how relativism and
deceitful tendencies may serve as antecedents of opportunism. We show that
opportunism can be triggered by intrinsic orientations in competitive negotiation
process (Bonoma, 1976) across different cultural contexts, which also explains how
intrinsic characteristics may lead an individual to a conscious decision to behave
opportunistically (John, 1984). This contributes to the negotiation ethics literature in an
international context.
Next, we add to the new perspective on opportunism (Malshe et al., n.d.) by testing it
within a cross-country context. This is particularly important with respect to deceitful
tendencies, which has received limited conceptual attention in the negotiation ethics
literature. Specifically, we do not focus on reasons for or frequency of deceit but view
deceitful tendency as a personality characteristic that varies across individuals in the
international context. In doing so, this study not only examines this understudied
construct but also situates it within the broader cross-cultural negotiation ethics
literature.
This work would be valuable if only as a validation of the various scales used in the
Belgian context. In addition, it contributes to the growing body of research related to
the emergence of global business ethics. Viewed together, our contribution thus lies in
exploring the role of relativism and deceitful tendency in the Belgian context for the
first time and offering an empirical comparison with that in the USA.
When viewed holistically, our results suggest that American and Belgian managers
may exhibit divergent levels of deceitful tendencies, relativism, opportunism and
perceptions of unethical negotiation tendencies. Our results, however, also show that
the impact of their deceitful tendencies and relativism on opportunism and that of
opportunism on the unethical negotiation practices shows convergence in terms of the
nature and strength of the relationships. Thus, this paper offers an important
perspective on the convergence versus divergence controversy (Bond and King, 1985),
which constitutes its third contribution.
Our work highlights an important distinction that should be made in this debate.
That distinction is between the levels of various ethical constructs and their impact on
other variables. In other words, between the level or amount of a construct such as
relativism and its impact on other constructs such as opportunism. While we believe
there are a variety of reasons to expect levels of constructs to converge, diverge or
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crossverge among different populations, we are skeptical that the structural
relationships among those constructs should. If such variances are found, we are
inclined to expect it is a result of an incomplete nomological network; in other words,
that an important moderating variable has been neglected.
Our findings may help managers in many ways. First, our work suggests that those
involved in international negotiations must simultaneously make two assessments
when it comes to their counterparts. They must first gauge the ethical stances of their
negotiation partners and then understand how those stances ultimately translate into
bargaining behavior; in other words, they must be able to say to themselves “if my
negotiating partner is opportunistic, then they are likely to try to make false promises;
therefore, I need to build in additional verification and governance measures”.
It is plausible that US managers may mistakenly conclude that their Belgian
negotiation partners are highly opportunistic, when, in fact, within the Belgian context,
they are not. This may force the US managers to proceed with undue caution. US
managers, however, should be aware that higher levels of relativism and deceitful
tendencies among Belgian managers may lead to higher levels of opportunism, just as
they would in the USA. And, as among US managers, higher levels of opportunism will
lead to a greater likelihood to engage in unethical negotiation tactics.
The US manager must also be sensitive to the differences due to the broader cultural
context. Conversely, to Belgian managers their US counterparts might all appear to
have very low levels of relativism, deceitful tendencies and opportunism. As a result,
their expectation might be that US managers might be easy marks in their
negotiations. Belgians might therefore be inclined to enact insufficient safeguards
against unethical behavior. They need to understand that, while US managers might
have lower levels of opportunism, etc, there is still variance and that relatively
opportunistic US managers may still try to take advantage of them; just as Belgian
managers would.
Taken as a whole, our research suggests that, contrary to traditional transaction
cost analysis, managers may not act opportunistically in negotiations with their
trading partners simply given that it is feasible and profitable to do so. The profitable
feasibility of opportunistic behavior should instead be viewed as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for such behavior. In addition to those external state conditions, we
see that the likelihood of opportunistic behavior increases as relativism increases, and
as the tendency to act deceitfully increases. Thus, in addition to the governance
structures typically prescribed to mitigate opportunism, we also observe that, given
the right business partner, transaction cost may remain low even in the absence of
explicit governance structures.
What is the appropriate level of external control mechanism required in a business
relationship? Our research suggests that managers would be well advised to gauge the
level of relativism and deceitful tendencies of their negotiation partners prior to
contracting with them. Business partners, regardless of country, that are less
relativistic and who have fewer deceitful tendencies may be engaged without over
emphasis on governance structures that, being unnecessary, would have the
unintended consequence of raising transaction costs. However, engaging a highly
relativistic business partner who has deceitful tendencies without the appropriate
governance structures will raise transaction costs via the higher levels of opportunism
they will manifest.

While managers have long taken advantage of informal opportunities to casually
take stock of their negotiation partners, the present research highlights the critical
importance of doing so and suggests that more formal mechanisms be put in place. We
leave sorting out what exactly those mechanisms might be to other researchers and
other studies.
Limitations and direction for future research
Before concluding, we recognize some limitations of the study. Our Belgian sample was
relatively small and method of data collection varied between the two countries.
Therefore, some of our cross-country conclusions should be treated as tentative and
our Belgian findings perhaps more exploratory in nature.
Also the RMSEAs in our analyses were generally above 0.09, and chi-squares
generated in the test of measurement invariance deteriorated as we constrained the
model, both potential causes for concern. In addition, one may argue that the construct
reliabilities and average variances extracted we report in Table IV are less than
optimal.
Both the USA and Belgium have cultures rooted in Northern and Western Europe,
are democratic, and have free-market economies. This might explain why we found
similar relationships among the constructs. Further, contextual factors such as the
nature of the prior inter-firm relationship or interpersonal relationships between the
negotiators could foster or hinder opportunism and the use of particular negotiation
tactics. We did not include these factors in our analysis.
Last, we have not examined how exposure to or evidence of deceitful tendencies,
relativism and opportunism from a negotiation partner may affect one’s own stance
vis-à-vis opportunism and those same behaviors, either within the US, within Belgium
or across the two countries. Future research may examine how other constructs such as
idealism interact with relativism to moderate opportunism. Testing our model in
different country contexts also remains a fruitful area for future research.
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